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This comprehensive text delves into the theory of incentives, focusing on the principal-agent model where a principal delegates tasks to an agent through contractual arrangements. The authors explore how to align the objectives of different parties to maximize outcomes, addressing information asymmetries such as adverse selection and moral hazard. The book provides methodological tools for designing institutions that ensure effective incentives for economic agents, making it a valuable resource for students, researchers, and professionals interested in contract theory and organizational economics.

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245: $a: THE THEORY OF INCENTIVES
245: $b:
082: $a:
100: $a: Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort
650: $a: Education
250: $a: 1st
440: $v:
250: $b: Princeton University Press
250: $c: 2002
020: $a: 978-0691091846
300: $a: 437